

Def. Doc. # 2462

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: HATOYAMA, Ichiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am HATOYAMA, Ichiro, and at present reside at No. 2174 KARUIZAWA. I was an official of the SEIYUKAI Party about 1931, and was appointed Minister of Education when the INUKAI Cabinet was formed, and remained in the same post in the succeeding SAITO Cabinet until the spring of 1934. Consequently I worked with Mr. ARAKI who was the Minister of War in these Cabinets.
2. The appointment of Mr. ARAKI as Minister of War was requested to the Emperor, in the customary way, by Mr. INUKAI. No issue was raised in any way in regard to this. At that time I did not hear of any recommendation or behind-the-scene maneuvering (T.N. in regard to the appointment of ARAKI) except the recommendation made by the big three of the Army.

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3. At the time of the formation of the INUKAI Cabinet, Japan was facing many difficulties both at home and abroad. Her home-front was unsteady and many unhealthy signs were noticed. Outwardly, there was general anxiety in regard to the Manchurian problem. Those days were so crucial that the WAKATSUKI Cabinet was forced to resign after the unsuccessful attempts to tide over the difficult situation by reorganizing itself into a coalition cabinet.
4. The INUKAI Cabinet made every possible effort to find a way out of the hopeless economic depression and to bring to a solution the impending Manchurian problem. Premier INUKAI, soon after the formation of his Cabinet, established a policy on gold embargo, and dealt with the economic stabilization, policy. Then by combining a policy which had been discussed in the SEIYUKAI Party and a report on military matters made by War Minister ARAKI which he received a few days after the formation of his cabinet, he defined on or about Dec. 7, the cabinet's policy on the prevailing situations.
5. When Manchukuo became an independent state the cabinets stand was a very serious one. According to a cabinet report made sometime about the middle of January, 1932, the local Manchurian officials were so enthusiastic that it was difficult to keep them under control, but the cabinet stuck to its policy of non-intervention. War Minister ARAKI was always prudent and stressed that the situation should be observed, and that the situation should be left to the Manchurians without our unreasonable interferences. The Premier who was concurrently the Foreign Minister agreed with him on that point. War

Minister ARAKI left all diplomatic affairs to the Foreign Minister, except the matter of maintaining peace and order. In the meantime, Mr. YOSHIZAWA was appointed Foreign minister late in January, but there was no change as far as the foreign policy was concerned.

6. The Shanghai Incident arose between our navy and some of the local people. The government received a report on the incident and it was desired that the Army dispatch troops to Shanghai. At the Cabinet meeting the troop dispatch was decided and the incident came to an end soon after. War Minister ARAKI was very eager to solve the incident speedily and when he withdrew the entire troops immediately after the hostilities ceased the public was deeply impressed.
7. The cabinet was changed as a result of the May 15 Incident, but I remained in office in the SAITO Cabinet. War Minister ARAKI tendered his resignation first. However, because of the earnest desire of Premier SAITO and because of the fact that the army had very little to do with the May 15 Incident, he also remained in office. The SAITO Cabinet was "a national cabinet" and included representatives from the two leading political parties. At that time the recognition of Manchukuo was being voiced by the public. A resolution was made to recognize Manchukuo at the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet by the three political parties, and the popular sentiment became very strong. Realizing the healthy development of the new state, the government decided to cooperate with this movement.

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Sometime in August, if I remember correctly, the cabinet deliberated on the matter and came to a decision to recognize Manchukuo, after the Foreign Ministry's explanation that the State of Manchukuo should be regarded as a disruption of China and the recognition of the new state was not a violation of the International Law. Hence the government made this public late in August and formally recognized Manchukuo on September 15, and then concluded the Protocol.

Respecting the opinion of then Foreign Minister UCHIDA, the War Minister left, as in the case of Manchukuo's recognition all diplomatic affairs to the foreign minister. There was no argument worth mentioning relative to this question at the cabinet meetings.

8. Thenceforth, all problems between Japan and Manchukuo were handled from the view point of joint military defense and in accordance with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol.

9. With regard to our policy towards the League of Nations, the cabinet never had any intention to withdraw from the League and Plenipotentiary MATSUOKA had been sufficiently advised to understand this.

War Minister ARAKI, also strongly sought to have an understanding with the League and insisted on staying in the organization until the last moment. But since the resolution of the general meeting was too far from the idea of the government, Japan was obliged to withdraw from the League. I sympathized with the pacifistic and humanitarian way of thinking of War Minister ARAKI, and among the cabinet members I was particularly intimate with him. As I saw him make no small efforts in bringing the Manchurian Incident to an end, I was also greatly delighted at seeing him satisfied with the conclusion of the Tangku Agreement.

10. Japan withdrew from the League of Nations because of her failure to get an understanding of the League. By the subsequent conclusion of the Tangku Agreement. The affairs relative to the military operations in Manchuria came to an end. From that time until his resignation, War Minister ARAKI made efforts to solve international problems confronting Japan and to relieve the people of their anxiety. For about half a year he had persuaded Premier SAITO

in his effort to adjust international relations and relations between national defense and diplomacy, and to solve the problems of the farm-villages. At the same time he attended the five minister's conferences on the domestic and foreign Problems. Above all, I know that Mr. ARAKI proposed a peace conference with a view to bringing about peace in the Far East, and made efforts toward the issuance of a decree of amnesty.

11. Mr. ARAKI, while deliberating on the contemplated plan, was obliged to resign his post because of his illness. When I called at his house to convey the idea of the Cabinet and urged him to remain in his post, he did not change his intention to resign; he said from his sick-bed that since it was now too late to formulate a national policy to stabilize the domestic and foreign situation, and since he will be unable to fight for it in the Diet when he recovers and since it is too important not to do anything about, he is resigning in order to have some suitable person to take over his post and carry out his ideas.

Both the Cabinet and the Diet understood the circumstances of the War Minister's absence from the Diet sessions and the Cabinet meetings. But Mr. ARAKI, very eager to formulate a national Policy, insisted that to be absent from the sessions of the Diet is no different from "not being in the post of War Minister." He

would not change his mind to resign. As far as I can remember, the basic plan which expressed his views was, at that time, presented to the Premier. Having had a regard for the Diet, he used to tell us that any opinion and view should be freely expressed in the Diet. Therefore, at this time when the national policy was being formulated he intended to take a full advantage of the freedom of speech in the Diet. He experienced difficulties particularly in bringing about the settlement of the Manchurian Incident; in order to end the hostilities, he tried to keep the overseas troops under control on one hand, and on the other hand he tried to keep the balance within the nation. Because of this, his attitude was branded as being half-hearted and was placed along with the other cabinet members on the assassination list in the SHIMPETAI Incident.

12. Mr. ARAKI was exceptional eager to cooperate with the Cabinet members and to keep the situation under control. As time went on he tried to be even more harmonious with the Cabinet and at the end of 1932 and again in 1933 he leaned backwards to make a concession in the budget in favor of the Navy at a great sacrifice on the part of the Army. All the persons concerned were deeply moved by his action that saved the Cabinet from the collapse. War Minister ARAKI took this step as he believed that the friction between the Army and the Navy would be a disgrace to this country, which, he feared, might delay the settlement of the Manchurian Incident.

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13. Mr. ARAKI had never said in Cabinet meetings that he was against something just because of the opposition from the Army circle or that he had to consult the Army officers before making a decision. In the Cabinet meeting he always discussed freely with the other ministers whatever he considered necessary to be discussed from the general point of view and gave his consent to the matters which he thought justifiable. At that time the people used to say, "Influence of the men of lower ranks over these of higher ranks". But Mr. ARAKI's attitude in the Cabinet meetings revealed no such indication.
14. I think it was in one of the Cabinet meetings held in the spring of 1933 that Mr. ARAKI asked the other members to express their opinions frankly, and not to be biased by the past actions of the army because he intended to make the Army sound and strictly disciplined. I remember Finance Minister TAKAHASHI and he had a great deal in common to talk about. Though being antagonistic to German militarism, aged Finance Minister TAKAHASHI sympathized with Mr. ARAKI concerning the latter's policy of cleaning up the Army, and they placed confidence in each other.
15. When Mr. ARAKI was the chief of the General staff in the spring of 1926, I went to see him to ask his opinion on the question of orienting the political parties in regard to the disarmament problems. He showed me his studies on war declarations which he

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used before the World War I when he was professor of the Army General Staff College. He said that there must be sound justifications for war and war should not be waged without such justification. Citing the examples of various countries, he expressed his views on the armament and war.

16. Ever since Mr. ARAKI resigned as War Minister, he had always been in obscurity. He was extremely concerned about the China Incident and the Greater East Asia War. Whenever I saw him in private meetings in those days, he maintained that proper steps should be taken immediately to meet the situation. He was unhappy for not being able to do anything about it.

O On this 28th day of Aug, 1947

At 2174, KARUIZAWA

DEPONENT /S/ HATOYAMA, Ichiro (seal)

I, TOKUOKA, Jirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /S/ TOKUOKA, Jirō (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HATOYAMA, Ichirō (seal)

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 述致シマス

宣誓供述書

供述者

鳩山 一郎

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞木利加合衆國 其他

荒太木貞 對 夫 其他

宣 誓 書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ黙秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

鳩 山 一 郎

一 私ハ鳩山一郎と申します。目下輕井澤二一七五番に居住して居ります。昭和六年頃は政友會の幹部で犬養内閣成立と共に文部大臣に就任引續き齋藤内閣に留任昭和九年春まで文部大臣でありました従つて閣僚として陸軍大臣たりし荒木氏は同時に勤務しました。

二 荒木氏が陸軍大臣に任命されたのは通常の手續により犬養氏より奏請されたもので別に何等問題はありませんでした。又當時陸軍三長官の推薦以外他より推薦又は策動のあつた事は聞きませんでした。

三 犬養内閣成立當時は内外多難な時で国内も安んず多く不祥な空氣をはらみ外は滿洲問題で一般に苦慮されて居るやうした若く内閣は舉閣一般内閣によりて時局を切抜けんとして失敗して倒れた程の重大なる

四 大藏内閣は行詰れる不景氣打開と滿洲問題處理を急務として之れに全力を盡しました大藏總理大臣は組閣後先づ金輸出禁止政策を定め經濟界の安定案を處理した後兼ねて黨に於て討議して居た方針を基礎とし組閣後二三日を経て荒木陸軍大臣の軍關係の報告を得て之等を綜合して十二月十七日要處理方針を決定しました

五 滿洲國獨立の時は内閣は慎重な態度を取りました、昭和七年一月半は頃の閣議報告には現地滿洲の要人が中々熱心なので押へ難い有様であるといふ事でありましたが干渉しないといふ方針に決りました。荒木陸軍大臣は常に自己論者で暫らく形勢を觀望し滿洲人に任せて無視すべきではないと主張されておりました當時總理大臣は外相を兼ねて居りましたが同一意見でありました、荒木陸軍大臣は治安維持以外は外交の事は外務大臣に任せて居りました。其内一月半御過ぎに芳澤氏が外務大臣となりましたが方針は別に變化はありませんでした

六 上海事件は海軍と現地民との間に起つたので政府報告を受け次で陸軍の出兵を要望し閣議にて出兵を決定し間もなく事態は終息しました、荒木陸軍大臣は事件の急速解決に熱心に努力し停戦後サツサと全兵力を引揚げ一同を感激させました

七 五・一五事件で内閣は更迭し私は齋藤内閣に留任しました荒木陸軍大臣も一度辭任しましたが齋藤總理の懇望と五・一五事件には陸軍關係が輕微であつた事とで留任されました。

齋藤内閣は學問内閣で二大兩政黨も參加して居りました當時滿洲國承認は

輿論となり第二十二議會にては三派政黨連合で滿洲承認を決議し承認同盟は急に高まり政府も新國家の健全なる發展を認め之れに協力することに成り、八月中と記憶しますが國議も對策を講し外務省も支那の國家分裂と見るべきで國際法違法でないといふ説明で承認することになり八月下旬に此事を發表し九月十五日に正式に承認し議定書を締結したのであります、陸軍大臣は承認の時機其他外交同盟は凡て當時の内田外相の意見を尊重して之れに一任され國體にても此問題に餘り記憶する様な議論はありませんでした

八 其後日滿間の諸問題は一切日滿議定書を本として陸軍共同防衛の立場から行動致しました

九 國際聯盟對策には國議は最初より聯盟脫退の意圖はなく松岡全權に十分理解を與ふる様にとの事でありました、荒木陸軍大臣も熱心なる聯盟との諒解論者で最後迄踏み止まる事を主張しましたか總會の決議が餘りに政府の意見と離れて居たので脱退する事になりました、私は荒木陸相の平和的人道的考へ方に共鳴し國條中に於ても特に別懇に交際致しましたか荒木陸相の滿洲事變終結の爲めに拂つや努力は側より見て居ても容易ならぬものかあつたので塘沽協定成立に對する彼の満足は私としても深く感喜致しました。

十 荒木陸軍大臣は聯盟に諒解が得られず脱退となり次いで増進協定に依つて全般的に滿洲の用兵關係が終りましたので外來辭位まで國際善後處置と國內人心の安定に努力せられ約半年の間齋藤首相にも説き對外對内の兩五相會議にも出席して國際關係の調整國防と外交との關係及農村問題に努力されました時に荒木氏は極東安定の平和會議提唱と大赦令の意圖を以て努力されたことは承知して居ります

十一、荒木氏は其籌策討議中病氣發作することになりましたが私が内閣の首魁を受けて留任を勸告に参りました時に病床から内外の情勢を安定すべき國策樹立に手後れしたので之れをとり返すために病後部會にて審議するに堪えなれし其體格を益々衰へたるに然るべき後任に自分の考を實行して貰ふためだと言はれて辭意を固しませんでした當時内閣も議會も陸軍大臣の缺席を承知してゐたのですが荒木氏は國策樹立の熱意の爲めにそれで虚脱だと主張されて翻意しませんでした確か其基礎となるべき其時總理大臣に衰情を陳べて忽ち呈出されました、荒木氏は議會を尊重し、よく議會で言論を十分なさしむべしと語つており國策樹立の時も大いに議會の言論に訴へようとして居たのでした。又支那事變處理に餘程意し其兵亂を終らす爲には一万は出先を揃へ一万は区内動員するに工夫をして居りました。之が爲めになまぬるしとして神兵に事件には内閣と共に暗殺の目標ともなりました

十二、荒木氏は内閣の協賛と時局收拾には格別の熱心さを以て居りました。内閣といよいよ折合つて昭和七年末にも年末にも陸軍預算を無理をして海軍に轉られ内閣の危急を救はれ一同を感激させました。これは時勢の紛争は我國の恥辱であり従つて支那事變の解決も急引く處れありとて陸相はこの處置に出られたのであります。

十三、荒木氏は閣議で曾て部内のもものが聴かないからとか部内に相談してとか言ふ様な事を言つた事は一度もなく大層上通由ありとした時には其場で十分計議し必要なりと認めた事であれば同意されてゐました。當時下剋上といふ噂がよくありましたが荒木氏の閣議の態度には之れを認められませんでした。

十四、昭和八年の奉天の閣議と云ひますが荒木氏は齋藤と共に正しき、日本の陸軍としたいから過去に於ける様を眼で陸軍を見ないでくれとて卒直に意見を求め高橋蔵相との間に大に附じた事がありました。

高橋蔵相は猶逸の皇國王親に就けなかつたがよく荒木氏の態度には共鳴され兩大臣は互に信頼して居りました。

十五、私は荒木氏の昭和三年奉天、参謀本部々長の時將來の軍備に關する政略の意見を養ふために荒木氏を訪ねて意見を求めました時に荒木氏は曾て陸軍大學校教官時代第一次世界大戰前籌備された内から軍戦を研究せるものを示され戦は名分が大切だ名分なき戦はなすべからずとて各國の例を挙げ軍備及戦争に對する所信を述べられた。

十六、荒木氏は陸軍大臣辭任後は終始不遇の地位にあり支那事變にも大東亞戦争にも頻る憂慮せられ當時屢々私的會合で面會した時には強く

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其善處を急ぐべしと主張し其の無力を歎じて居ました。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十八日 於

輕井澤二一七五

供述者

鳩山 一郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於 同 所

立 會 人

德 岡 二 郎